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CIVIL RIGHTS
OVERVIEW
During the past survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed several important civil rights issues. In the area of age dis-
crimination, it reviewed the level of evidence necessary for a jury to de-
cide by inference whether age discrimination had occurred. Also, it
examined the availability of front pay and liquidated damages under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the Act or ADEA). Further, the
court reiterated its policy of liberal construction of civil rights com-
plaints. The Tenth Circuit also held a governmental representative lia-
ble for injuries to an individual's reputation. Despite its consistent
liberal position on these civil rights issues, however, the Tenth Circuit
narrowed its view on the availability of attorneys' fees awards under sec-
tion 1988.
I. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
A. ADEA Litigation: Sufficiency and Structure of a Disparate Treatment Suit1
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the Act or ADEA)
2
generally prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals
between the ages of forty and seventy3 with respect to their employment
based on age. 4 The broad language of the Act has provided wide lati-
tude for judicial determination of the elements of an ADEA prima facie
case. Substantively, the ADEA is similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII) 5 which prohibits employment practices that dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
6
Thus, for guidance in ADEA litigation, the courts have looked to the
body of Title VII case law.
1. Disparate treatment should be distinguished from disparate impact. The former
occurs when some individuals are treated less favorably because of a trait upon which such
different treatment may not be lawfully based. The latter occurs when facially neutral
conduct falls more harshly on one group than another. See International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-1 7 (1982).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1982). The Supreme Court has noted that the substan-
tive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978); see also Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818,
820 (5th Cir. 1972) (ADEA terms are essentially identical to those of Title VII).
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1. The Prima Facie Case 7
The Title VII case which has influenced ADEA litigation most sig-
nificantly is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,8 in which the Supreme
Court set forth guidelines sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination based on race. 9 A typical ADEA application
of these guidelines for a claim of wrongful discharge requires that a
plaintiff show: (1) membership in the protected age group; (2) satisfac-
tory job performance; (3) discharge; and, (4) after discharge, that the
plaintiff's position was filled by a younger worker.10
The moderate initial burden of the McDonnell Douglas model" is
meant to assure "the plaintiff his day in court despite the unavailability
of direct evidence." 12 Discrimination is usually a covert process and the
employer is in the best position to explain why an individual has been
adversely affected by work-related decisions.'
3
The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that the McDonnell
Douglas model is not a rigid or mechanical method to be applied in all
discrimination cases.1 4 It is merely one method particularly suited to
establishing a claim based on circumstantial evidence. 15 It should be
noted that where direct evidence is available, the model has been found
7. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Court
made clear in what sense the term "prima facie case" is used in Title VII cases: "the
establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" as opposed to a plaintiff's
burden of producing evidence sufficient to permit the trier of fact to make inferences. Id.
at 254 n.7.
8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9. These guidelines require a plaintiff to assert: (1) racial minority status; (2) appli-
cation and qualification for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(3) rejection, despite qualification; and, (4) after rejection, the employer's continued
search for applicants with plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802.
10. See, e.g., Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1979); accord Haskell
v. Kamon Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 1984) (although replacement need not be less
than 40 years old, he should be substantially younger); cf Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766
F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 796 (1986) (substantial age difference
may be sufficient for inference of age discrimination).
11. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621 (1983)
(stating that a prima facie ADEA case is so easy to establish that most plaintiffs will need
stronger evidence to get case to jury on issue of illegal motivation).
12. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979).
13. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
The model effects its purpose by immediately establishing that a plaintiff's rejection was
not based on "the two most common legitimate reasons:" lack ofjob qualifications or lack
of a job vacancy. Id. at 358 n.44.
14. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
575-76 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973); see also
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 (rejecting defendant's objection to the use of the McDonnell Douglas
formulation as a "strict analysis" only suited to "more invidious" forms of discrimination
such as race or gender). But cf. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 n.4 (6th Cir.
1975) (finding that the McDonnell Douglas model is suited only for bench trial; because of
the natural progression of younger workers replacing older ones, the model is too strict to
account for differences in age and Title VII-type discrimination). See generally Comment,
Adjudicating ADEA Disparate Treatment Claims Within the Evidentiary Framework of Title VII An
Order of Proof for Age Discrimination Cases, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 865 (1983).




Establishment of a prima facie case is the initial step in an employ-
ment discrimination action. The plaintiff continues to bear the burden
of persuading the trier of fact that age was a determinative factor in his
rejection.17 By establishing a prima facie case the plaintiff can withstand
the defendant's motion for directed verdict' 8 and the burden of produc-
tion shifts to the defendant.' 9
2. Shifting Burdens: Order of Proof
The general structure of Title VII disparate treatment cases as set
forth in McDonnell Douglas has been uniformly adopted in ADEA litiga-
tion. The format involves three basic trial stages with stage one being
the showing of a prima facie case.2 0 If the plaintiff succeeds in such
proof, stage two shifts the burden of production, requiring the defend-
ant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection."'' z Should the defendant meet this requirement,
stage three shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to prove that the em-
ployer's reasons were not true, but a pretext for discrimination.
22
The requirements of the employer's stage two burden were made
clear by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
flexible and pragmatic nature of the model is exemplified by its various forms, designed
for differing fact situations.
For cases supporting a finding that when a discharge is the result of a reduction in
work force, a showing of replacement is unnecessary, see Caldwell v. National Ass'n of
Home Builders, 771 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1985); Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770
F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1985); McCuen v. Home Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1981); McCor-
stin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg.,
Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1985) (in reorganization case plaintiff must show
more than mere termination; for example, statistical or circumstantial evidence of prefer-
ence for younger employees).
For examples of other variations, see Garner v. Boorstin, 690 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (where claimant seeks and is denied employment, it is sufficient that available posi-
tions were filled by individuals with comparable qualifications who were not members of
the protected class); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977)
(evidence ofjob qualification may be unnecessary where strong evidence of improper reli-
ance on age criterion exists).
16. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Lindsey v. Ameri-
can Cast Iron Pipe Co., 772 F.2d 799 (11 th Cir. 1985); Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp.,
710 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Stanojev v. Ebasco Serv., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d
Cir. 1981) (direct proof of discrimination, statistical evidence, or other circumstantial evi-
dence can obviate need to rely on McDonnell Douglas model).
17. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983); Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253; EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985); Perrell v. Finance America Corp., 726 F.2d 654,
656 (10th Cir. 1984).
18. Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976); cf. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. at 254 (if employer is silent after establishment of prima facie case, court
must enter judgment for plaintiff); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1015 (prima facie case may entitle
plaintiff to directed verdict if defendant fails to carry burden of production).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 20-28.
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); see also Burdine,
450 U.S. at 252-53.
21. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
22. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
1987]
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Burdine. 23 Whereas the plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of per-
suasion, 24 the employer's burden merely is to rebut the presumption of
discriminatory motive which the prima facie case establishes.2 5 It is suf-
ficient for the employer to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the alleged
discrimination. 2 6 However, the explanation of the factual issue must be
specific enough to allow the plaintiff a fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext.
2 7
Stage three of the trial should result in a "new level of specificity"
into the factual inquiry. 28 This higher scrutiny results from focusing the
evidence on any underlying reasons for the employer's actions. Stage
three therefore, completes an order of proof which is essential for nar-
rowing the issues and enabling the trier of fact fairly to decide if age was
a determinative factor in an employer's decision to reject an employee
or applicant.
3. EEOC v. University of Oklahoma
Marion Clark, a 59 year old employee of University of Oklahoma
(OU), applied for the available position of section chief, cartography
section of the Oklahoma Geological Survey (OGS), a department of
OU. 29 Dr. Charles Mankin, head of OGS, chaired a nineteen person
search and selection committee which, after a nation-wide advertising
campaign, narrowed the field of applicants to three.3 0 Ms. Clark was the
only internal applicant among the three and was rejected in favor of a
Mr. Furr, then age thirty-six a' The EEOC filed this action on behalf of
Ms. Clark.
3 2
At trial the parties stipulated that the plaintiff had made out a prima
facie case. 33 However, there was conflicting testimony as to any actual
discriminatory conduct on the part of OU. The search committee mem-
bers who testified stated that age discrimination did not enter into their
voting process.3 4 The defendant's proffered rationale for not promot-
ing Ms. Clark was her lack of management experience and problems
with productivity. Testimony detracting from this reasoning showed
23. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
24. Id. at 253.
25. Id. at 254.
26. Id. at 254-55.
27. Id.; see also Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978) (per curiam)
(this burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale is met by an explanation
by the employer of what he has done). For a discussion of different ways of demonstrating
pretext, see Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases,
32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1154 n.128 (1980).
28. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
29. EEOC v. University of Okla., 774 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1985), rev k 554 F.
Supp. 735 (W.D. Okla. 1982), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1637 (1986).
30. EEOC v. University of Okla., 554 F. Supp. 735, 737 (W.D. Okla. 1982), revd, 774
F.2d 999 (10th Cir. 1985).
31. University of Okla., 774 F.2d at 1001.
32. The ADEA provides for administration and enforcement by the EEOC. 29 U.S.C.
§ 633a (1982).
33. University of Okla., 774 F.2d at 1001.
34. University of Okla., 554 F. Supp. at 738.
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that Dr. Mankin had no way of knowing or measuring productivity
levels. Moreover, though Ms. Clark had no extensive managerial experi-
ence, the applicant chosen may have had less.
3 5
On appeal from judgment n.o.v. rendered in favor of OU, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.3 6 It found that the district
court had granted the judgment n.o.v. in error by reweighing the evi-
dence and injecting its own view of the witnesses' credibility. 37 The dis-
trict court had found that in stage three of the trial, 38 the plaintiff's
evidence supported only "murky theories" that OU's articulated reasons
for Ms. Clark's rejection were pretextual.3 9 The Tenth Circuit set out
much of the testimony in its opinion and concluded that it was reason-
able for the jury to infer that age discrimination was a factor in OU's
hiring decision.
40
In his concurring opinion, however, Judge Seth wrote that it was
unnecessary for the court to set out the "ritual" of the McDonnell Douglas
model. After the trial had taken place, he reasoned, the model had
served its purpose and had become irrelevant. 4 ' At the appellate level,
Judge Seth favored applying only standards for judgments n.o.v. rather
than conducting an in-depth review of the evidence.
42
4. Analysis
EEOC v. University of Oklahoma demonstrates the value of the McDon-
nell Douglas prima facie model and order of proof structure in disparate
treatment litigation. Where all the evidence is circumstantial and the
testimony disputed, the Supreme Court's Title VII guidelines provide
the trier of fact with a workable model in which it can separate and ana-
lyze the probative force and credibility of such evidence.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in this case clearly supports the use of
the McDonnell Douglas model. The model provides a means for guiding
the trier of fact through a narrowing of issues so that a rational determi-
nation can be made as to whether the plaintiff's ultimate burden has
been met. In EEOC v. University of Oklahoma, the district court abrogated
the benefits and policies behind the model by taking the case away from
the jury.4 3 Civil rights actions alleging age discrimination deserve to be
35. University of Okla., 774 F.2d at 1002.
36. Id. at 1000.
37. Id. at 1002.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
39. University of Okla., 554 F. Supp. at 740. The district court found that even though
problems existed in the cartography section, this fact could not be used to support an
inference of a "scheme" or "plot" against Ms. Clark. Id.
40. University of Okla., 774 F.2d at 1003. Much of the evidence advanced for Ms. Clark
showed that Mr. Furr's conduct in his new job was similar to that which OU proffered to
denigrate her suitability for the position. See id.
41. Id. at 1004-05 (Seth, J., concurring); see also EEOC v. Samsonite Corp., 723 F.2d
748, 749 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding that when the McDonnell Douglas model has been used at
trial and the inquiry has reached the ultimate question of discrimination, it has served its
purpose and drops out of the case).
42. Id. at 1004-05 (Seth, J., concurring).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
19871
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given close scrutiny because discrimination is usually secretive and al-
ways subjective. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit was correct in critically
analyzing the lower court's decision.
University of Oklahoma recently has served as precedent allowing the
Tenth Circuit to reverse a directed verdict against another ADEA plain-
tiff in Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp.4 4 In Cockrell, the Tenth Circuit found
that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed from which a jury could
have determined a discriminatory purpose in the defendant's offer of
demotion.
4 5
B. Monetary Remedies Under the ADEA
Section 2(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
4 6
provides that the purpose of the legislation is "to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; [and] to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment."' 4 7 The remedial provi-
sions of the ADEA4 8 incorporate portions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), 4 9 and together the two statutes provide for a wide range of
remedies. 50 Furthermore, the Act's broad allowance of trial court dis-
cretion 5 ' to fashion remedies creates a mandate to "make whole" suc-
cessful ADEA plaintiffs. 5 2  This broad interpretation of ADEA
guidelines has been embraced by the Tenth Circuit.
5 3
1. Liquidated Damages
The availability of liquidated damages is a frequently litigated reme-
dial issue under the ADEA. When liquidated damages are awarded
under the ADEA, the plaintiff is awarded not only unpaid wages, but
also an additional equal amount constituting liquidated damages. 5 4 The
44. 781 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1986).
45. Id. at 179. The Tenth Circuit found that in granting the directed verdict for the
defendant, the trial court erroneously acted as factfinder. The Tenth Circuit cited EEOC v.
University of Okla., 774 F.2d 999, 1002 (10th Cir. 1985), rev g 554 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Okla.
1982), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1637 (1986), to support its finding.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
48. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b)-(c) (1982).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). The incorporated provisions of the FLSA are
§§ 211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217.
50. The available remedies include "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act], including without limitation, judgments compel-
ling employment, reinstatement or promotion," or damages in amounts "deemed to be
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982)
(emphasis added).
51. See id.
52. E.g., Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1984); Gibson
v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982).
53. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976), affd per curiam by an
equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977) (ADEA is "humanitarian legislation" which should
be liberally construed in order to end age discrimination).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). For a brief discussion of liquidated damages, see
Nosier & Wing, Remedies Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 62 DEN. U.L.
REV. 469, 481-83 (1985) and Richards, Monetary Awards forAge Discrimination in Employment,
30 ARK. L. REV. 305, 327-36 (1976).
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ADEA specifically states that liquidated damages are only to be awarded
when an employer's acts are found to have been willful. 55
Some courts have found that liquidated damages are compensatory
and therefore such "double recovery" as liquidated damages plus pre-
judgment interest can be denied. 5 6 Others have held that liquidated
damages are punitive, thereby allowing awards of both types of relief.
5 7
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Trans World Airlines
v. Thurston.5" The Thurston Court found that Congress intended liqui-
dated damages to be "punitive in nature" 59 and adopted a "reckless dis-
regard" standard for determining willfulness. 6 0
Although the ADEA and FLSA contain similar remedial require-
ments, the Acts differ in their provisions for the award of liquidated
damages. The ADEA requires a finding of willful violation for an award
of liquidated damages 6 ' while the FLSA does not.62 Thus, the Court's
interpretation that Congress intended liquidated damages to be punitive
in nature when awarded under the ADEA is supported by the differences
in the remedial provisions of the two statutes.
2. Front Pay
Front pay is another highly contested issue in ADEA litigation. It is
generally awarded as compensatory damages for amounts not yet in-
curred by a plaintiff at the time of trial. 63 Courts are in general agree-
ment that front pay exists as a part of the broad remedial powers of the
Act even though it is not explicitly provided for in the ADEA.64 This
construction is consistent with the liberal "equitable relief ... without
55. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
56. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
874 (1984); see also Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982)
(no award of both liquidated damages and prejudgment interest absent exceptional cir-
cumstances); cf. Heiar v. Crawford County, Wis., 746 F.2d 1190, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985) (ADEA liquidated damages are compensatory, delay being
one item compensated); Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945) (liquidated
damages under the FLSA compensate for delay and therefore prejudgment interest is not
available).
57. E.g., Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 556 (9th Cir. 1983); Hannon
v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Colo. 1977).
58. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
59. Id. at 624.
60. Id.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
62. The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982), provides a FLSA defendant with
a defense against liquidated damages when he can show good faith and reasonable
grounds for believing the challenged conduct was not in violation of the FLSA.
63. See generally EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985) (future damages in lieu of reinstatement);
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) (prospective damages);
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1984) (front pay is damages
for loss of future earnings).
64. See Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass n, 763 F.2d at 1172 (legal and equitable reme-
dies in ADEA are not limited to those enumerated in Act); Davis, 742 F.2d at 922 (consis-
tent theme among the circuits is that front pay award is in the discretion of trial court); cf.
Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (lst Cir. 1982) (no future damages for time
after which plaintiff has secured a higher paying job).
19871
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limitation" language of the Act 6 5 and the "make whole" purpose attrib-
uted to it.
6 6
The major concern courts have expressed in allowing front pay is its
inherently speculative nature.6 7 Circuits that recognize front pay as a
remedy have not been deterred by its speculative nature, but rather have
used it reasonably by formulating limitations on its applicability. 68 Most
courts have awarded front pay only in lieu of the preferred remedy of
reinstatement when reinstatement is not feasible.6 9 Where hostility ex-
ists between the parties70 or where the defendant cannot offer a position
comparable to plaintiff's previously held one, 7 1 front pay has been
awarded as a viable alternative. At least one court has disallowed front
pay where substantial liquidated damages were sufficient to make the
plaintiff whole. 72 Since there is no per se rule for awarding front pay, the
use of this remedy is usually left to the sound discretion of the trial court
in the calculation of damages.
73
3. Smith v. Consolidated Mutual Water Company
Eugene Smith was fired from his job with Consolidated Mutual
Water Company (Consolidated), allegedly for falsifying water meter
tests.74 Smith was not confronted with the falsification charge before
the decision was made to discharge him. His supervisor, who was twenty
years his junior, replaced him with a younger worker. Smith sued Con-
solidated, claiming that it had violated his rights under the ADEA by
firing him because of his age. At trial, Smith presented evidence that he
had been discriminated against both verbally and through job perform-
ance evaluations.
The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict which in-
65. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); see supra note 50.
66. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
67. E.g., Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d at 1173; Cancellier v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). For a dis-
cussion of the problem of speculation in front pay awards, see Note, Front Pay: A Necessary
Alternative to Reinstatement Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
579, 603-06 (1984).
68. See supra note 67.
69. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d at 1172-73; Davis v. Combustion Eng'g,
Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724,
728 (2d Cir. 1984); Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1319-20; Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695
F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1982); cf. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748
F.2d 1543, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's unreasonable refusal of reinstatement pre-
cludes recovery of both back pay and front pay).
70. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d at 1172; Dickerson v. Deluxe Check
Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983); Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1319-20.
71. See EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981) (front pay awarded until plaintiff is reinstated in "rightful
place"); cf. Dickerson, 703 F.2d at 280-81 (defendant's policy is against reinstatement to a
"high level" position).
72. Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1319. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that a substantial verdict of over two million dollars had made the
plaintiffs whole. Id. at 1320.
73. See, e.g., Davis, 742 F.2d at 922-23 (award of front pay to 41 year old until age of
retirement is probably unwarranted).
74. Smith v. Consolidated Mut. Water Co., 787 F.2d 1441, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 64:2
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cluded an award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement. 75 Consolidated
appealed, maintaining that the evidence was insufficient for a prima facie
ADEA claim and that the award of front pay was in error.76 Smith cross-
appealed, claiming that Consolidated's actions constituted a willful vio-
lation of the ADEA and therefore liquidated damages should also have
been awarded.
7 7
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's award of front pay in
lieu of reinstatement. 78 It concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's verdict. However, Smith's cross-appeal for liquidated
damages was denied based on the "thin and circumstantial" nature of
the evidence.
79
Judge Barrett filed a dissent in which he argued that liquidated
damages are designed to compensate for nonpecuniary or highly specu-
lative losses and that front pay, having a similar purpose, is simply a
form of liquidated damages.8 0 Characterizing front pay as a legal rem-
edy rather than an equitable one, he argued that the legal remedies
under the ADEA are those specifically enumerated - unpaid wages, un-
paid overtime, and liquidated damages. Judge Barrett concluded that if
front pay is allowable at all, it is necessarily as a liquidated damage. 8 '
Therefore, he reasoned, since Smith was ineligible for liquidated dam-
ages because no willful violation had been established, he was equally
ineligible for front pay.
8 2
4. Analysis: The Status of ADEA Remedies in the Tenth Circuit
Judge Barrett's argument that front pay is simply a form of liqui-
dated damages fails to take into consideration the Supreme Court's re-
cent portrayal of liquidated damages under the ADEA as punitive. 83
This "punitive nature" colors liquidated damages with a purpose some-
what different than that of front pay. 84 Thus, Judge Barrett's fear of a
"double-barrel" approach, though not unfounded, 8 5 goes too far.
Judge Barrett is not alone in the Tenth Circuit in his analysis of the
front pay issue. In Bum v. Western Electric Co., 8 6 ChiefJudge Seth wrote a
separate opinion opposing the use of this remedy. He argued that even
though the ADEA grants broad equitable powers, these cannot be used
to expand the legal remedies specifically enumerated in the Act. 8 7
75. Id. at 1443.
76. Id. at 1442.
77. Id. at 1443.
78. Id.
79. Id. Consolidated's conduct was not found to be "willful" under the Thurston stan-
dard; see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 1444 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1444-45 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1446 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
83. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985).
84. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
85. Smith, 787 F.2d at 1443 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
86. 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. !11 (1984).
87. Id. at 1481 (Seth, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
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The language of the ADEA belies such an argument. When read as
a whole it gives the courts wide discretion in fashioning legal and equita-
ble relief to effectuate its purposes. 88 Judge Barrett's depiction of front
pay as a legal rather than an equitable remedy is of no assistance in de-
termining how these purposes can best be served. Since the Tenth Cir-
cuit has recognized front pay only in lieu of the equitable remedy of
reinstatement, its application is more equitable in nature than it is legal.
Therefore, an award of front pay should not be dependent upon meet-
ing the standard for an award of liquidated damages. Through Smith,
the Tenth Circuit has reaffirmed its alignment with other circuits that
have held that front pay and liquidated damages are not interdependent
remedies under the ADEA.8 9
II. SECTION 1983
A. Sufficiency of Civil Rights Complaints Against Municipalities
1. General Sufficiency
Liberal federal pleading requirements 9 ° and the broad scope of civil
rights statutes allow for a low threshold of sufficiency for civil rights
complaints. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Section 1983)91 is the
broadest piece of legislation in federal civil rights law.9 2 Instead of pro-
viding substantive rights, section 1983 ensures a private right of action
for constitutional violations. 93 To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must allege that some person, acting under color of state law, has de-
prived him of a federal right.94 Of course, factual allegations in support
88. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53. For a discussion of the differences be-
tween the legal and equitable remedies available under the ADEA, see Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575 (1977).
89. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 726-28 (2d Cir. 1984);
Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983); O'Donnell v. Georgia Os-
teopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds,
748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984); see also Note, Front Pay: A Necessary Alternative to Reinstatement
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 607-08 (1984) (ar-
guing that front pay and liquidated damages should be regarded independently).
90. One only needs to include a jurisdictional statement, unless the court already has
jurisdiction, a short and plain statement to show entitlement, and a demand for judgment.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
91. The pertinent portion of section 1983 is:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (section 1983 should be
interpreted with sufficient liberality to fulfill its purpose of providing a federal remedy in
federal court for protection of a federal right).
93. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (a
litigant cannot claim a violation of section 1983; section 1983 merely provides a remedy).
94. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); see Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013,
1016 (2d Cir. 1983); Brantley v. Surles, 718 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (5th Cir. 1983); Wirth v.
Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978); Flemming v.
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of the claim must also be advanced. 9 5 Generally, a civil rights complaint
will not be dismissed summarily unless it appears beyond doubt that a
plaintiff cannot prove any facts which would support the claim.
9 6
2. Municipal Liability
A 1978 Supreme Court decision has had significant impact on civil
rights litigation. In Monell v. Department of Social Services,9 7 the Court
expressly overruled Monroe v. Pape9 8 by holding that local governing
bodies can be sued under section 1983.9 9 This decision has raised a
question as to what sort of act or conduct of a municipal employee will
create liability on the part of a municipality.
The Monell Court went far towards defining the outer reaches of
municipal liability. Even though a municipality may be subject to sec-
tion 1983 claims, the court held that a municipality will not be liable
solely because an employee has committed a tort. 10 0 Relying on the
language of section 1983 itself, the Court found that if the challenged
conduct does not occur under the color of an ordinance or regulation, a
plaintiff must show that it rises to a level of policy, custom, or usage.
10 1
A custom or usage is inferred from any edict or act which "may be said
to represent official policy."
0 2
Adams, 377 F.2d 975, 977 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). Compare State ex rel.
Gore v. Wochner, 620 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980) (transgres-
sion of specific and articulable constitutional right and cognizable claim for relief must
appear on face of pleadings) with Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (civil rights com-
plaint need only set forth facts giving rise to cause of action). But cf. Keniston v. Roberts,
717 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1983) (section 1983 complaint need not set out particular
constitutional or statutory basis for claim so long as court can ascertain that claimed rights
exist); Bonner v. Circuit Ct., 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946
(1976) (court has duty to determine if allegations could support relief on any possible
theory).
95. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
96. E.g., Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1983); District 28 United Mine
Workers v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Wells, 566
F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 991 (1970).
97. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
98. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court overruled this case to the extent that it held
municipalities were not "persons" for section 1983 purposes and, therefore, were not sub-
ject to suit. However, it left the Monroe "intent" requirements of a section 1983 claim
intact.
99. Monett, 436 U.S. at 700-01.
100. Id. at 691.
101. See id. at 690-91, 694. Quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68
(1970), the Court recognized that certain practices of local officials could easily be so prev-
alent as to carry the force of written law. MoneUt, 436 U.S. at 691.
For language emphasizing the importance of alleging a policy or custom, see Powe v.
City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 652 (7th Cir. 1981) (civil rights action against city cannot
be maintained without adequate allegation of policy by either direct or implied charge of a
practice); Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 683 (1st Cir. 1980) (section 1983 claim not stated
against a municipality in absence of allegation of official policy); Walters v. City of Ocean
Springs, 626 F.2d 1317, 1323 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (city cannot be held liable
where it is not alleged that injury resulted from the carrying out of municipal policy or
custom); see generally Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or
Custom, " 79 COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1979).
102. Monett, 436 U.S. at 694. For a discussion on what persons acting in which capacity
1987]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
After a custom or usage has been established, the plaintiff must
clear another hurdle by showing a nexus between the municipal policy
and the act or conduct which caused an injury.10 3 If a causal connection
is not sufficiently shown, the court will not hold the municipality liable
for the employee's acts. 10 4 In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 10 5 the Sup-
reme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision that a single unconstitu-
tional act by a police officer was sufficient to establish municipal
liability. 10 6 The Tenth Circuit had upheld a jury instruction which al-
lowed a finding of liability where an officer's acts were so egregiously
out of accord with accepted practices that a policy of inadequate training
or supervision could be inferred.' 0 7 The Supreme Court made clear
that no liability should attach absent a finding that some fault can be
attributed to municipal policymakers.t°8 Thus, it is insufficient to infer
a policy from a single incident which itself gave rise to the cause of
action.
However, upon proving an unconstitutional policy, a single act
based on this policy may breed section 1983 liability.10 9 In Garcia v. Salt
Lake County," l0 the court found that the combined actions of the jail em-
can be deemed acting for government, see Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979).
103. See Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983). The Batista court
found that a plaintiff in a Monell-type case must "plead and prove three elements: (1) an
official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right." Id. The mere allegation of a pattern without a causal link will not
suffice. Id.
See also Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1241 (11 th Cir. 1985) (causal connection
between official's acts and deprivation of rights may be shown where widespread abuse
puts official on notice; personal involvement is not required); Espino v. City of Kingsville,
676 F.2d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (city not liable for death of Mexican-
American inmate in absence of showing of policy of discrimination). Compare Rankin v.
City of Wichita Falls, 762 F.2d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 1985) (decedent's attempt to rescue co-
worker not attributable to any misuse of power by city) with Cameo Convalescent Center,
Inc. v. Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 846 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) (nexus
between harmful act and infringement of rights too attenuated for liability to attach).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01; see also Ross v. Reed, 719 F.2d 689, 698
(4th Cir. 1983) (doctrine of respondeat superior has no place in section 1983 litigation);
Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1335 (10th Cir. 1981) (city not liable under theory of re-
spondeat superior for police officer's civil rights violations).
105. 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985) (plurality opinion). Tuttle sued Oklahoma City under sec-
tion 1983 after a city police officer shot and killed her husband.
106. See Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2427 (1985).
107. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2435.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2436. Though not deciding the issue, the Court indicated that it may be
possible to base municipal liability on a constitutionally sound policy. This would require
much more proof than a single incident in order to show municipal fault and a causal
connection between the policy and the constitutional deprivation. Id. See also id. at 2441
n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (finding no need for the "metaphysical distinction"
between unconstitutional policies and policies which cause constitutional violations).
110. 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985). The widow and parents of Ronald Garcia brought
a section 1983 action against Salt Lake County and the jail employees following Garcia's
death in the countyjail. The decedent had ingested an overdose of a prescription barbitu-
rate which was legally in his possession. Pursuant to a practice of the jail, the officers,
believing him to be only under the influence of alcohol, admitted him to jail in an uncon-
scious state. The jail and the sheriff had written policies prohibiting this practice. Id.
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ployees formed an unconstitutional policy which created municipal lia-
bility even though no one individual employee's acts or omissions
violated a right."' The "cumulative effect" of the individual acts or
omissions was attributable to the defendant county's unconstitutional
practices.1 1 2 Shortly thereafter, the Tenth Circuit addressed the suffi-
ciency of a municipal liability complaint which alleged a causal connec-
tion between a policy and a failure to act."
13
3. State ex rel. Candelaria v. City of Albuquerque
Billy Candelaria, a Mexican youth, drowned in an inadequately
maintained syphon culvert in the South Valley region of Albuquer-
que. 114 Plaintiff sued the City of Albuquerque, Bernalillo County, and
the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, alleging that the drowning
was a violation of Billy Candelaria's civil rights." 5 The plaintiff based
his civil rights claim on an alleged custom of discriminatory failure to
provide services in the area because the area was populated mostly by
persons of Mexican-American descent.' 16 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants neglected and refused to maintain the syphon culvert in
which Candelaria drowned and that it was the defendants' policy not to
provide adequate services to the South Valley area."
17
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.* 18 It found that there was no causal
connection between the allegation of defendants' failure to maintain the
culvert and the claim of a custom of discrimination. 119 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit found that the complaint could be read as alleging inten-
tional discrimination based on race, and therefore, the plaintiff's claim
under section 1983 was sufficient.l
2 0
In finding the plaintiff's complaint sufficient to state a cause of ac-
tion under section 1983, the Tenth Circuit relied on the rule that "the
complaint should be construed liberally in favor of an interpretation
which states a cause of action." 12l The court did not specifically reach
the issue upon which the district court dismissed the action. 122 Instead,
it merely concluded that the complaint could be reasonably interpreted
to allege "that the defendants discriminated against an area of the city
predominately occupied by Mexican-Americans because it is occupied by
Mexican-Americans." 123
111. Id. at 310.
112. Id.
113. State ex rel. Candelaria v. City of Albuquerque, 768 F.2d 1207 (10th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 1208.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1209.
118. See id. at 1208.
119. Id. at 1209.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1210.
122. See supra text accompanying note 119.
123. Candelaria, 768 F.2d at 1209 (emphasis added). The majority opinion quoted a
lengthy portion of the complaint, which alleged inter alia, that the defendants' failure to
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4. State ex rel. Candelaria v. City of Albuquerque: An Analysis
By reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit has af-
forded this plaintiff an opportunity to prove that an unconstitutional
custom or policy exists. If the plaintiff is able to meet the burden of
proof, the nexus between the unconstitutional custom or policy and the
violation of Billy Candelaria's rights is much stronger than the connec-
tion found in Garcia.124 Here, since the policy would be one of failure to
act, the only actors involved are those who set the policy or allow it to
exist. The policy and the harmful omission merge and the policy itself
could trigger liability. As the Garcia court found, "gross deficiencies and
deliberate indifference" in procedures can serve to form a custom or
policy. 125
The Tenth Circuit has remained open-minded on the question of
municipal liability despite Tuttle. Garcia demonstrates this by its finding
of municipal liability based on a single incident which resulted from an
underlying unconstitutional policy. Candelaria confirms the trend by rec-
ognizing a cause of action based on an alleged unconstitutional policy of
omission. Regardless of whether a unity of discriminatory policy and
failure to maintain the culvert is found to have existed in Candelaria, the
"single incident" of such failure can still cause liability to attach based
on Garcia.
B. Enforcement of Due Process Interests in Employment
Enforcement of constitutional rights is one of the many purposes of
section 1983.126 Its broad language allows for a private right of action
against any person who under color of law deprives an injured party of
any federally protected right.12 7 Section 1983 has played its most signif-
icant civil rights role as enforcer of the fourteenth amendment's liberty
and property interest guarantees.'
2 8
1. Property Interests
The seminal property interest cases are Board of Regents v. Roth 129
maintain the culvert was a "direct result of a custom and usage" of defendants' failure to
provide services to the general area. Id. This language asserts a causal connection be-
tween the policy and the harmful omission. The court found that the complaint was
sufficient.
124. In Garcia, there were identifiable actors involved who were initially named as de-
fendants. See Garcia v. Salt Lahe County, 768 F.2d 303, 309 n.6 (10th Cir. 1985).
125. See Garcia, 768 F.2d at 308.
126. See supra note 91.
127. See id. For an in-depth analysis of the elements of a prima facie section 1983 claim,
see J. MAHONEY, SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 119-36 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle ed.
1983).
The "color of law" requirement of section 1983 is met by any conduct constituting
state action. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982), rev g 639 F.2d
1058 (4th Cir. 1981).
128. Section 1983 began as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. That section's
purpose was to enforce the fourteenth amendment. For a description of the purposes of
section 1983, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972).
129. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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and Perry v. Sindermann .130 These provided the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to delineate the types of interests that are of sufficient im-
portance to be deemed constitutionally protected.
In Roth, the respondent sued a state university at which he had been
an untenured professor. Without notice or hearing, the university de-
cided not to renew Roth's employment contract. Roth claimed a pro-
tected interest had been violated but the Court found that since his one-
year contract had terminated he had no protected interest.1 3 1 To ac-
quire a property interest in a benefit, a person must have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" to it. 13 2 An abstract desire or unilateral expecta-
tion is not sufficient.' 3 3 The Court left open, however, a broad spec-
trum of conditions which could qualify an interest as protected by due
process. These protected interests can be created and defined by rules
or understandings based on state law that support "legitimate claims of
entitlement." 1
34
In Perry, the Court clarified the extent to which it will recognize
property interests. Like Roth, Sindermann was an untenured teacher at
a state institution. Unlike Roth, however, Sindermann was found to
have a case for a property interest in his employment. The Court found
that a college manual and state tenure guidelines may have created a
legitimate expectation of continued employment; if so, Sindermann was
entitled to a due process hearing on allegations against him. 13 5 Ex-
panding on Roth, the Court indicated that implied contracts, circum-
stances, and unwritten understandings and practices could create




The fourteenth amendment requires due process for governmental
deprivation of liberty interests.138 In employment actions there is a fine
line between the twin concepts of liberty and property. Many times, a
due process analysis will properly include an examination of both liberty
and property interests.139 However, property cases generally are more
dependent on the legitimate expectancy, while liberty cases focus more
on a measure of damage to individual reputation sufficient to foreclose
130. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
131. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. The Court also found that Roth had no liberty interest. Id.
at 575.
132. Id. at 577.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Peny, 408 U.S. at 600-03.
136. Id. at 601-02.
137. Id. at 603.
138. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
139. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972); Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir.
1976).
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some future opportunity. 140 Liberty interest cases, therefore, usually
arise from a claim of deprivation of rights due to a state-created
stigma. 141
In Wisconsin v. Contantineau, 142 the appellee challenged the constitu-
tionality of a state statute which allowed authorities to post her name as
an "excessive drinker" who could not be sold liquor. 143 In finding her
claim valid, the Supreme Court stated broadly that where a person's
good name or reputation is impugned by government conduct, due pro-
cess is required. 
144
In Paul v. Davis,14 5 however, the Court did not find that a liberty
interest had been violated when the police department distributed a
brochure to local businesses containing respondent's picture and the
designation "active shoplifter."' 146 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, distinguished and limited the broad language of Constantineau.
He wrote that in Constantineau the appellee's future right to purchase
liquor was deprived by the stigma and, therefore, a violation of her lib-
erty interests rose to constitutional status. The stigma alone would have
been insufficient to require the procedural protection of due process. 1
47
Since most discharges or non-retentions will reflect negatively on
an employee's character, courts must take care to find a protected liberty
interest only when a state-created stigma seriously damages an individ-
ual's ability to be reemployed.14 8 The Tenth Circuit has recognized that
liberty interests of public employees involve two particular aspects:
(1) the protection of reputation, and (2) the freedom to pursue employ-
ment opportunity."49 Further, the Tenth Circuit has found valid liberty
interests to exist even though an employer alleges willful neglect and
incompetence, 150 but nonexistent under charges of improper job per-
formance.' 5 ' Similarly, employer accusations involving correctable fail-
ures are not so stigmatizing so as to foreclose job opportunities.'
52
140. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-75.
141. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 753 F.2d 1092, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing
the "reputation plus" standard used in liberty interest cases); Martin v. Unified School
Dist., 728 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that "[t]he liberty interest protected by
the Constitution is the individual's good name and his freedom to work") (citations omit-
ted); Bartel v. F.A.A., 725 F.2d 1403, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (where government, by injur-
ing a person's reputation effects a removal or significant change of an interest protected by
law, due process is required).
142. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 437.
145. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
146. Id. at 711-12.
147. Id. at 708-09.
148. See Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335, 1339 (10th Cir.
!976).
149. Weathers, 530 F.2d at 1338 (citing Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.
1972)). Weathers treated the two aspects as severable; the case was decided before the
Supreme Court decided against such a view in Paul; see supra text accompanying notes 145-
47.
150. See Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908, 911 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977).
151. See Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323, 327 (10th Cir. 1974).
152. See Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 64:2
CIVIL RIGHTS
Recently, the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to decide whether a lib-
erty interest claim should be upheld when there was a decline in busi-
ness rather than a discharge or non-retention.
3. Corbilt v. Andersen
Corbitt was employed by a Wyoming school district as a school psy-
chologist. Additionally, he had a private practice for which he gained
clientele by referrals from two state agencies. He brought a section 1983
suit against Andersen, the director of Southwest Counseling Service, a
political subdivision of the county. He claimed that Andersen, acting
under color of state law, campaigned to discredit his professional stand-
ing, defamed him, and caused him to lose.his referral clients. 153 The
jury found in Corbitt's favor and Andersen appealed, claiming insuffi-
cient evidence to establish a section 1983 claim. The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the jury's verdict.
The Tenth Circuit decided that Paul v. Davis '54 did not require a
reversal of the district court's judgment. The majority held that the jury
could reasonably find that Andersen had not only defamed Corbitt, but
also that he had created a stigma which foreclosed Corbitt's freedom to
find other employment.'
55
Judge Bohanon disagreed in an extensive dissent. He argued that
Corbitt had no contracts, and thus no legally protected right to his refer-
ral work. 156 Judge Bohanon claimed that the majority had stated in con-
clusory language that contracts existed between the state agencies and
Corbitt and that the jury had found intentional, improper interference
with such contracts.' 
5 7
Judge Bohanon also took exception to the court's reliance on
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners.158 In Schware, the Supreme Court
found that a liberty interest had been violated when the petitioner was
denied the opportunity to take the New Mexico bar examination. 159
Judge Bohanon noted that Schware's claim was based upon his being
completely precluded from practicing his profession. 160 In the instant
case, Corbitt was merely subjected to an adverse influence which re-
duced the number of his referrals.
16
4. Corbitt v. Andersen: An Analysis
In Corbitt there was no question of whether a defamation occurred.
Rather, the central issue was whether the defamation infringed upon a
153. Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985).
154. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
155. Corbitt, 778 F.2d at 1475 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972)).
156. Id. at 1476-77 (Bohanon,J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1481 (Bohanon, J., dissenting).
158. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
159. Id. at 246-47.
160. See Schware, 353 U.S. at 234.
161. Corbitt, 778 F.2d at 1480 (Bohanon, J., dissenting).
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liberty interest held by Corbitt. The majority held that it did, by fore-
closing his freedom to engage in work opportunities, 16 2 but did not ex-
plain the nature of such interest. The majority sidestepped the
threshold issue of whether Corbitt's referral business rose to the level of
a protected liberty interest. Apparently, the court was content to leave
undisturbed the jury's finding that Corbitt's "contractual relations" had
been violated. 1
63
The dissent pointed out that Corbitt's own testimony tended to re-
fute the existence of a contract. 16 4 It may be that the majority saw no
need to base its decision on the existence vel non of a contract. 16 5 It
merely concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a decline in the
value of Corbitt's private practice to support a finding of a violated
interest. 166
The outcome of the case is not clearly incorrect. Corbitt had more
than a "mere subjective expectancy" 167 in his referral work. 168 Even so,
the majority's deference to the trial court and jury has added confusion
to the state of liberty interest law in the Tenth Circuit. While the court
has in the past tried to provide some guidance as to a minimum type of
foreclosure of employment opportunity required to sustain such a case,
here it has failed to provide any clarification. The incisive dissent cor-
rectly takes the court to task for its deferential and conclusory analysis.
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
A. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 (the Act or sec-
tion 1988) 169 provides that in federal civil rights actions "the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs."'1 70 The Act was drafted in direct response to a
1975 Supreme Court case which denied an attorney's fee award to civil
rights plaintiffs. 171
162. Id. at 1475.
163. See id. at 1474.
164. Corbitt testified that he had understandings with the state agencies, but that they
were under no obligations. Id. at 1476 (Bohanon, J., dissenting).
165. The Supreme Court has recognized that an interest of constitutional magnitude
can arise from mutually explicit understandings. See supra text accompanying notes 134-
37.
166. Corbitt, 778 F.2d at 1475.
167. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (to determine whether due process requirements apply, courts must
look to the nature and not the weight of the interest at stake).
168. Corbitt had an ongoing relationship with the state agencies through which he ob-
tained referrals. Corbitt, 778 F.2d at 1473.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
170. Id.
171. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (plaintiffs
winning an injunction against issuance of permits authorizing construction of trans-Alaska
oil pipeline). Alyeska was simply a re-affirmance of the "American Rule" which generally
prohibits an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing civil litigant absent express statutory
authority to do so. See id. at 247, 269.
[Vol. 64:2
CIVIL RIGHTS
The policy behind section 1988 is based on a recognition that the
protection of civil rights is strongly dependent upon private enforce-
ment, which is too often deterred by the high cost of litigation. 172 Sec-
tion 1988 is intended to insure effective access to the courts for civil
rights claimants.17 3 Awards of attorneys' fees are an essential part of
vindicating civil rights grievances. 174 In effect, a plaintiff is compen-
sated for his efforts as a "private attorney general."
1 75
Two major issues pervade section 1988 litigation. The first con-
cerns what constitutes a "prevailing plaintiff." After a court has deter-
mined that a plaintiff has prevailed, the second issue involves what
standard should be used to determine a fees award amount.
1. Defining Success
In order to meet the threshold requirement for a fees award, a
plaintiff must prevail.1 76 He must "succeed on any significant issue...
which achieves some of the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit."'1 7 7 A
plaintiff has been found to prevail when a consent decree has been en-
tered into prior to final judgment. 178 A plaintiff has also prevailed when
his case, although mooted before judgment, was catalytic in prompting
civil rights reform. 17 9 The Tenth Circuit, following the lead of the
Supreme Court, has recognized that where civil rights are vindicated, a
plaintiff need not obtain formal relief to be considered prevailing for
section 1988 purposes.' 8 0
2. Degrees of Success
After a plaintiff has prevailed, the amount of reasonable fees owing
must be determined on the facts of the case.' 8 ' General guidelines for
the computation of fees are provided in the legislative history of section
1988.182 These include the much-contested factor of the relationship
172. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 5908, 5910 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
173. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
174. SENATE REPORT, supra note 172 at 2.
175. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam);
Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1041 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
176. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
177. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978), quoted in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
178. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 791-
92 (10th Cir. 1980).
179. Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Fischer v. Adams,
572 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1148-49 (11 th Cir.
1985) (vindication of rights does not depend on the necessity of litigation); Morrison v.
Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981)
(when defendants cease their challenged conduct, the fact that the plaintiffs dismiss the
action makes no difference in the award of attorneys' fees).
180. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 792 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448
U.S. 122, 129 (1980)).
181. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
182. Both the House and Senate approved of the twelve factors listed in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The factors are:
(1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of issues; (3) skill required; (4) pre-
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between the potential award and the actual results obtained. Generally,
it has been held that a plaintiff advancing multiple claims and prevailing
on less than all of them is entitled to attorneys' fees, so long as the
award is adjusted to reflect the degree of success realized.' 8 3 The
Supreme Court recently has affirmed this view in Hensley v. Eckerhart.
184
In Hensley, the Supreme Court attempted to provide reasonable
guidelines to alleviate the disparity in standards and computation meth-
ods used by the various circuits. It stated that after a plaintiff is deemed
to have prevailed, a product of reasonable hours multiplied by reason-
able rates must be found. 18 5 The trial court must then engage in an
adjusting computation by addressing two questions: (1) did the plaintiff
fail to prevail on all claims that were unrelated to his successful claims,
and (2) was the plaintiff's degree of success such that hours reasonably
expended are a satisfactory basis for making a fees award. 18 6 The first
question is useful for mechanically cutting out a proportion of an award
which is allocable to distinct unsuccessful claims. The second reaches
the situation in which a plaintiff's several claims "involve a common
core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories."' 8 7 In "such a law-
suit" the Court asserted, the trial court must consider the significance of
the relief obtained in relation to hours expended.' 88
A more difficult issue arises when a plaintiff has technically pre-
vailed in a single-claim case but is not awarded the relief requested. It
has been held that an award of nominal damages does not constitute
special circumstances and in such cases attorneys' fees are available.18 9
clusion of other employment due to the case; (5) customary fees for similar work;
(6) whether fees are fixed or contingent; (7) time constraints imposed by client or circum-
stances; (8) amount involved and results obtained; (9) experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys; (10) undesirability of the case; (11) nature and length of professional
relationship with the client; and, (12) amounts awarded in similar cases. See Thome, The
Court's Discretion in Assessing Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 2 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 283 (1979). The Tenth Circuit has stated that the trial court need not
consider all of these factors in determining an award. Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729,
732 (10th Cir. 1981).
183. See Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1026 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs gaining in-
junctive relief but not monetary damages are entitled to attorneys' fees), cert dismissed sub
nom., Ledbetter v. Jones, 453 U.S. 950 (1981); see also Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,
278-79 (1st Cir. 1978) (fees award is based on work performed on successful claims). But
see Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977) (winning on only one of six claims is
not sufficient to obtain attorneys' fees), reh'g en banc, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
184. 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) (unrelated claims must be treated separately so that no
fee is awarded for work on failed claims).
185. Id. at 434.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 435.
188. Id. at 434-35 (emphasis added).
189. See Milwe v. Cavuota, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1981) (trial court abused discretion
in denying fees award to plaintiff winning one dollar in damages); Skoda v. Fontani, 646
F.2d 1193, 1194 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (jury verdict of one dollar entitles plaintiffs
to attorneys' fees); Perez v. University of P.R., 600 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979) (fees award is
not inconsistent with award of nominal damages); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 616-18 (4th
Cir. 1978) (recovery of nominal damages does not diminish eligibility for fees award,
though it is a factor in determining amount); cf. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 557 (10th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting practice of reducing fees awards because of limited recovery). But cf.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 742 F.2d 590, 591 (11 th Cir. 1984) (it
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In Ramos v. Lamm,' 90 the Tenth Circuit made its position clear that an
award of attorney's fees in civil rights litigation should not be reduced
solely because the damages awarded were nominal.' 9 ' The Ramos court
declared that a fees award should not be required to have a particular
relationship to a recovery amount.'
9 2
During this survey period, the Tenth Circuit dealt with the issue of
whether fees awards should be reduced in a case in which plaintiffs pre-
vailed on their single claim but were awarded only nominal damages.
B. Nephew v. City of Aurora
Plaintiffs sued Aurora police officers under the Civil Rights Act,'
93
alleging that they were assaulted, battered, and falsely arrested, and that
it was the custom of the city to discriminate against blacks. 194 They
sought relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages in the
amount of two million dollars.
Two of four plaintiffs prevailed and were awarded damages of one
dollar each. The plaintiffs moved for an attorneys' fees award pursuant
to section 1988. In calculating the amount of the award, the court re-
duced the amount sought by subtracting for time spent on a state
claim 19 5 and also to account for the fact that only two of the original
four plaintiffs prevailed. 19 6 The defendants requested that the court re-
duce the fees award further based on the nominality of the damages
awarded. The court denied this request and the defendants appealed.
The Tenth Circuit subsequently agreed with the defendants and re-
versed and remanded the case to reduce the attorney's fees award.
19 7
Although Ramos v. Lamm 198 is applicable, the Nephew court wrote that "it
ha[d] yet to address the precise issue."1 99 The Tenth Circuit reasoned
that because Nephew sought damages and Ramos sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, the Ramos language was dicta and should not con-
trol.2 00 Judge Barrett, writing for the majority, quoted Cooper v.
Singer2 0 1 to emphasize that the Act's purpose is not merely to encourage
private enforcement of civil rights, but to encourage meritorious civil
is insufficient that claims were not rejected on their merits, the primary relief sought must
be obtained).
190. 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983).
191. Id. at 557.
192. Id.; see also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(attorneys' fees award not required to be proportionate to amount of damages civil rights
plaintiffs recovered).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
194. Nephew v. City of Aurora, 766 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1985).
195. The police officers had filed suit against the plaintiffs in state court alleging assault
and battery. This suit was later dismissed by stipulation and is irrelevant for purposes of
this article. Id. at 1465 n.l.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1467.
198. 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983).
199. Nephew, 766 F.2d at 1465.
200. Id. at 1465-66.
201. 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
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rights claims.20 2 The court concluded that "results obtained" is an im-
portant factor that must be considered in determining the reasonable-
ness of a fees award.
20 3
In a forceful dissent, Judge McKay argued that civil rights suits seek
to vindicate constitutional rights and their success should not be a func-
tion of the amount of damages awarded. 20 4 He viewed the court's reli-
ance on Hensley and Cooper as misplaced. According to Judge McKay,
Hensley and Cooper both dealt with multiple claims and stand for the prin-
ciple that a reduction in fees awards is required when plaintiffs prevail
on less than all of the claims they have asserted. 20 5 In Nephew, the plain-
tiffs prevailed on their only claim.
C. Nephew v. City of Aurora: An Analysis
The Nephew court erroneously relied on Hensley v. Eckerhart.
2 06
Hensley did not address the problem of single-claim cases. Therefore,
the Nephew court should have relied on Ramos and its correct statement
of Hensley that the results-obtained factor should be used to reduce fees
awards only in cases where multiple claims are brought and some of the
claims have failed.
20 7
The Hensley rationale withstands closer scrutiny. If a plaintiff ad-
vances five claims and is successful on only two, the question of whether
he has prevailed in the case as a whole is inextricably intertwined with
how close the results obtained are to the results sought. Success in such
a case is necessarily a matter of degree and the only equitable measure
of that degree lies in a qualitative examination of the results obtained.
Fairness to a defendant requires that an award be adjusted so that
the degree of success can be measured and limited proportionately.
Fairness to a plaintiff requires that the time and effort expended to the
extent of success realized be rewarded. To mechanistically disallow an
award because of partial success would create unnecessary apprehen-
sions in bringing multiple, possibly meritorious claims.
In a single-claim action, however, success and vindication of civil
rights grievances are immediately discernible by a jury verdict or court
judgment. The fact that actual damages are nominal in no way detracts
from the social benefit achieved from a plaintiff's efforts in bringing a
suit, or from the fact that a constitutional wrong was committed. It fol-
lows that nominal awards in multiple-claim suits should not be consid-
ered in reducing a fees award. The victory in Nephew demonstrates as
much. Aurora police officers should be deterred from engaging in the
202. Id. at 1502 (emphasis added). The Cooper court viewed section 1988 as "strik[ing]
a delicate balance, encouraging civil rights litigation where success can be achieved
through a reasonable expenditure of legal services." Id.
203. Id. at 1466 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).
204. Id. at 1467-68 (McKay, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 1467 (McKay, J., dissenting).
206. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
207. See Ramos, 713 F.2d at 556.
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type of behavior that gave rise to discriminatory practices following this
case despite the fact that only nominal damages were awarded.
Judge McKay correctly noted in his dissent that a civil rights "inter-
est is vindicated whenever a plaintiff proves, in open court, that he or
she has suffered discrimination. '20 8 Section 1988 was enacted to en-
courage just such vindication.
20 9
Hugh S. Pixler
208. Nephew, 766 F.2d at 1467 (McKay, J., dissenting).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 169-75.
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